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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the labor market dynamics in a matching model where
fluctuations are driven by movements in the discount factor. A comparison with the
standard productivity shock is provided. Movements in the discount factor can be
used as a proxy for variations in financial risks, especially the expected payoff from
hiring workers. It is shown that the canonical matching model under a very standard
calibration is able to generate an important volatility of unemployment and vacan-
cies with respect to output. We estimate the structural model with the two shocks
and using the Bayesian methodology. The bulk of variations in unemployment and
vacancies is mainly explained by disturbances pertaining to the discount factor. Pro-
ductivity shocks account for most of the historical output variations but the discount
factor plays a more important role over the last two decades.
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1 Introduction
The ability of the search and matching model (Mortensen-Pissarides, 1994) to
reproduce the cyclical behavior of key labor market variables has received an
important attention. Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) argued that the model,
in its standard form, is clearly unable to generate substantial fluctuations in
unemployment, vacancies and the labor market tightness as compared to the
data. The reason is that wages absorb most of the variations coming from
productivity shocks.
This puzzle has led to an important literature trying to modify the match-
ing model using wage rigidities (Shimer (2005), Hall (2005), Gertler et al. (2008),
Hall & Milgrom (2008)), small surplus calibration (Hagedorn & Manovskii
(2008)), workers and jobs heterogeneity (Krause & Lubik (2006), Chassam-
boulli (2013)), alternative forms of hiring costs (Yashiv (2006), Fujita & Ramey
(2007), Rotemberg (2008), Pissarides (2009)) counter-cyclical payroll taxes (Burda
& Weder (2010), etc. The list is far from being exhaustive. All the aforemen-
tioned specifications have attempted, directly or indirectly, to prevent wages
from adjusting rapidly. A notable exception is a study by Di Pace & Faccini
(2012) that introduced deep habits in the matching model. They show that
this produces endogenous countercyclical mark-ups and generates amplifica-
tion in the response of labour market variables to technology shocks. Most
of these studies1 assumed that labor market fluctuations are solely driven by
a productivity shock. However, many economists and institutions have cast
some doubts on the movements of productivity as a main driver for business
cycle fluctuations, especially over the last three recessions in the US. In this
paper we study the labor market dynamics but we consider an alternative
source of business cycle fluctuations: variations in the discount factor2. We
argue that disturbances of the discount factor provide an important source of
propagation. The relative volatility of unemployment and vacancies is well
reproduced.
The discount rate expresses the difference between the remuneration of the
risk free bonds and risky bonds also know as the risk premium. In a paper
closely related to ours, Hall (2014) wonders what force depresses the payoff to
job creation in recession. He noticed that a rise in the discount rate has similar
effects to an increase in financial risks. It makes employers less prone to invest
in any type of investments, including job creation. A rise in the risk premium
reduces the expected payoff from hiring a new worker because the real interest
1With few exceptions like Rotemberg (2008) who uses changes in market power as a source
of business fluctuations but it still make real wages less procyclical. Faccini & Ortigueira (2010)
assume that investment-specific technology fuel up the cycles and found that is helps to solve
the unemployment volatility puzzle.
2For Cochrane (2011) the real interest rate, discount factor and risk premium are all the
same.
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rate is simply the rate at which firms discount their future profit streams. The
fall in the expected value of a filled job lowers firms’ jobs openings which, in
turn, increases aggregate unemployment. An adverse shock on the discount
factor can then be viewed as a proxy for the financial market turmoil since it
impacts the interest rate in a way that mimic the Great Recession.
Most of the studies on the dynamics of the DMP model assumed that TFP
shocks track labor market fluctuations. Figure 1 and 2 show the cyclical com-
ponent of the labor market tightness against that of discount factor3 rate and
that of productivity. While the movements in productivity seems to provide
a rational explanation for the labor market dynamics until 1982, the path of
productivity and tightness do not really support this view over the last three
decades. On the other side, the labor market tightness seems to be highly cor-
related with the discount rate, particularly over the last two decades. There-
fore, the role of disturbances pertaining to the discount factor must be ques-
tioned. We do not explain what exacerbates the uncertainty on financial mar-
kets. There is an abundant literature on this topic. We simply assume that a
shock on the discount rate is a simple proxy for frictions in financial markets.
We try to understand how the risk translates in the labor market and how firms
react to changes in future flow of profits. Our analysis goes one step further
than Hall (2014) since we focus on the volatility puzzle rather than the inter-
actions between labor and financial market and we investigate the respective
role of the two shocks for unemployment, vacancies and output dynamics in
an estimated model.
It is shown that the discount factor shock can explain a large part of the
observed labor market fluctuations but has difficulties to account for the ob-
served output volatility. The productivity shock reaches the opposite conclu-
sions. An estimation of the structural model shows that variations in the dis-
count factor and in productivity are both needed to match empirical moments.
However, the bulk of variations in unemployment and vacancies is mainly ex-
plained by disturbances pertaining to the discount factor. The productivity
shock accounts for most of the output variations but the discount factor has
gained an increasingly role over the last two decades. We argue that the in-
troduction of the discount factor shock to proxy financial risk in a very simple
way is key to improve the fit of the canonical search and matching model.
3See appendix A for data description and methodology
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Figure 1: Cyclical component of Productivity and the labor market tightness.
Figure 2: Cyclical component of Real interest rate and the labor market tightness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the pre-
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sentation of the dynamic matching model. Section 3 addresses calibration and
simulations. An estimation of the structural model using Bayesian methodol-
ogy is presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We use a discrete time version of the standard matching model. Separations
are exogenous. Labor is the only input into the production process and it may
be adjusted through the extensive margin (employment). Wages are set ac-
cording to a Nash bargaining process.
2.1 Matching
A job may either be filled and productive, or unfilled and unproductive. Work-
ers are identical and they may either be employed or unemployed. The num-
ber of matches, mt, is given by the following Cobb-Douglas matching function:
mt = χj
γ
t v
1−γ
t ≤ min(jt, vt) (1)
where vt ≥ 0 denotes the mass of vacancies, jt ≥ 0 represents the mass of
searching workers. The matching function (1) is increasing and concave in its
two arguments and homogenous of degree 1. A vacancy is filled with probabil-
ity qt = mt/vt and the job finding probability is ft = mt/jt. Total employment
is nt and the number of job seekers is defined by jt = 1 − (1 − s)nt−1. The
labor force is assumed equal to one such that end-of-period unemployment is
ut = 1− nt. The employment law of motion is given by:
nt = (1− s)nt−1 + mt (2)
which implies that hirings are immediately productive4.
2.2 Representative household
The representative household maximizes aggregate consumption5 ct:
max
ΩHt
E0
∞
∑
t=0
(
t
∏
k=0
βk
)
ct (3)
4It should be noticed that our results remain unchanged with an employment law of motion
that is entirely backward: nt = (1− s)nt−1 + mt−1, mt = ftut
5For the sake of clarity, we consider a linear utility function. Results are robust to a more
standard CRRA utility function.
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subject to the budget constraint:
ct = wtnt + jtb + Πt + Tt (4)
the job seekers jt definition and the law of motion of employment:
nt = (1− s)nt−1 + ft jt (5)
βt represents a discount factor shock with β0 = β. wt is the wage level. Πt rep-
resents profits from holding shares in firms and Tt is a lump-sum tax. The rep-
resentative household derives utility b from unemployment (unemployment
benefits). Prices are normalized to 1. The program consists of choosing the set
of processes ΩHt = {ct, nt}∞t=0 taking as given the set of processes {wt, ft}∞t=0
so as to maximize their intertemporal utility. The optimality conditions of the
household’s problem defines the marginal value of employment for a worker:
ϕt = (wt − b) + Etβt+1(1− s)(1− ft+1)ϕt+1 (6)
2.3 Firms
The optimization problem of the firm consists of choosing the set of processes
ΩFt = {vt, nt}∞t=0 taking as given the set of processes {wt, qt}∞t=0 so as to maxi-
mize the following intertemporal profit function:
max
ΩFt
E0
∞
∑
t=0
(
t
∏
k=0
βk
)
(yt − wtnt − κvt) (7)
subject to the production function and the law of motion of employment:
yt = ztnt
nt = (1− s)nt−1 + qtvt
Hiring is costly and incurs a cost κ per vacancy posted. zt is an aggregate
productivity shock. The optimality conditions of the above problem gives the
job creation condition which equal expected surplus from a filled job µt to the
expected cost of search:
κ
qt
= µt (8)
µt = zt − wt + (1− s)Etβt+1µt+1 (9)
Combining the two gives the job creation condition:
κ
qt
= zt − wt + (1− s)Etβt+1
κ
qt+1
(10)
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2.4 Wages
The wage is determined every period through an individual Nash bargaining
process between each worker and the large firm, who share the total surplus
of the match. The standard optimality condition of the above problem is given
by: ξµt = (1− ξ)ϕt where ξ ∈ [0, 1] and 1− ξ denote the workers and firms
bargaining power respectively. Using equation (6), (8) and (9), one has:
wt = ξ (zt + Etβt+1(1− s)κθt+1) + (1− ξ)b (11)
To close the model we define profits as Πt = yt − wtnt − κvt which, com-
bined with the household budget constraint (4) and the government budget
constraint Tt = jtb, yields the following market clearing condition: ct = yt −
κvt. The discount factor shock and the productivity shock follow an autore-
gressive process with mean β and z respectively:
log βt+1 = ρβ log(βt) + (1− ρβ) log(β) + ε
β
t+1 With ε
β ∼ N (0, σ2β) (12)
log zt+1 = ρz log(zt) + (1− ρz) log(z) + εzt+1 With εz ∼ N (0, σ2z ) (13)
2.5 Model calibration
We adopt a very standard calibration based on US data and quarterly frequen-
cies (See Table 1). We set the steady state discount factor to 0.99. The US
unemployment rate u is about 6% on average over several decades. We set the
probability of being unemployed s = 6% which correspond to an average be-
tween BLS (0.1) and SIPP (0.028)6. At the steady state, the number of matches
must be equal to the number of separations: m = sn with n = 1− u = 0.94.
We get the number of job seekers from the definition j = 1 − (1 − s)n and
a job finding rate f = m/j ' 50%. Following den Haan et al. (2000), the
rate at which a firm fills a vacancy is about 0.71. Then, we deduce v = m/q
and set χ in such a way that m = χjγv1−γ. We set b to 0.45 which implies
that utility from unemployment is about half of the wage at the steady state,
consistent with DOLETA replacement ratio. We impose the Hosios condition
ξ = 1−γ = 0.5 from Petrongolo & Pissarides (2000). We deduce κ from the job
creation condition. Hiring costs κv represent about 5% of total output which
is a little bit higher than the conventional ratio of 1.6% but not too much. We
first assume that the persistence and the standard deviations are the same for
zt and βt. They are equal to 0.9 and 1%. We further investigate these values in
section 3.3.
6See Nagypál (2008) for a comparison
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Variables Symbol Value Source
Discount factor β 0.99 4% yearly real interest rate
Separation rate s 0.06 BLS, SIPP
Utility when unemployed b 0.45 ' 0.5 * wage
Worker bargaining power ξ 0.5 Hosios
Elast. matching w.r.t u γ 0.5 Hosios
Vacancy posting cost c 0.66 Deduced
Matching efficiency χ 0.59 Deduced
Autocorrelation coefficient ρβ 0.9 Assumed
Std. of β shock σβ 0.01 Assumed
Autocorr. coefficient zt ρz 0.9 Assumed
Std. of zt shock σz 0.01 Assumed
Table 1: PARAMETERS
3 Results
3.1 Data
Variables u v θ w y
Standard deviation 7.70 9.72 17.16 0.46 1.55
Autocorrelation 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.88
Correlation u v θ w y
u 1 -0.94 -0.98 -0.12 -0.87
v 1 0.99 0.19 0.91
θ 1 0.16 0.91
w 1 0.31
y 1
Table 2: LABOR MARKET STATISTICS - DATA. All variables are reported in logs
as deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 1600. Standard deviations
are relative to output except output.
Table 2 describes the unconditional empirical moments for U.S. data. Unem-
ployment and vacancies are respectively about 8 and 10 times more volatile
than output. Both are strongly correlated which implies a labor market tight-
ness that is about 17 times more volatile than output. As shown by Shimer
(2005), the wage volatility is low and weakly correlated with others variables.
All variables are highly persistent.
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3.2 Simulations
The simulated moments are reported in Tables 3 and 4. It is shown that the
two shocks involve similar patterns regarding the correlations and the per-
sistence of the variables. They both reproduce a consistent Beveridge curve
and enough persistence of the variables. The striking difference between the
two shocks concerns the volatility of the labor market. The productivity shock
implies tiny variations in labor market quantities. The volatility of unemploy-
ment, vacancies and the tightness are far smaller than their empirical counter-
parts. The productivity shock has no difficulties to generate the observed fluc-
tuations in output. The discount factor shock is the opposite. It generates too
much volatility in unemployment and vacancies w.r.t. output7. On the other
hand, a large standard deviation of the shock is needed to match the volatility
of output. Furthermore, it produces a strong volatility in wages due to the ex-
pectations term in Equation (11). The mechanism behind the discount factor
shock lies in the movements of the expected hiring costs (the last term on the
RHS in Equation (10)). It directly impacts the payoff to job creation. As firms
experience drastic variations in the expected payoff from hiring a new worker
they adjust job openings very sharply. The productivity shock increases the
job productivity but also the wage rate due to the Nash structure of wage. The
latter effect offsets the former which implies less variations in the expected
gain from hiring a new worker.
One may naturally wonder whether combining the two shocks will re-
sult in more realistic moments. The previous results are conditional on the
parametrization of the shocks and the calibration. But how large is the stan-
dard deviation and the persistence of each shock? Which one mainly governs
the fluctuations in unemployment, vacancies and output? This we investigate
now more formally.
7Increasing the volatility of the shock does not impact the relative standard deviation
σx/σy, x = u, v, θ, w of the variables. This result holds using a perturbation method of order 2
and 3.
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Variables u v θ w y
Standard deviation 1.47 1.15 1.71 0.83 2.49
Autocorrelation 0.96 0.75 0.90 0.90 0.91
Correlation u v θ w y
u 1 -0.85 -0.97 -0.97 -0.98
v 1 0.95 0.95 0.95
θ 1 1.00 1.00
w 1 1.00
y 1
Table 3: LABOR MARKET STATISTICS - PRODUCTIVITY SHOCK ONLY. All
variables are reported in logs as deviations from an HP trend with smoothing param-
eter 105. Standard deviations are relative to output except output.
Variables u v θ w y
Standard deviation 15.67 12.27 18.30 5.36 0.28
Autocorrelation 0.96 0.75 0.90 0.90 0.96
Correlation u v θ w y
u 1 -0.85 -0.97 -0.97 -1.00
v 1 0.95 0.95 0.85
θ 1 1.00 0.97
f 1 0.97
y 1
Table 4: LABOR MARKET STATISTICS - DISCOUNT FACTOR SHOCK ONLY.
All variables are reported in logs as deviations from an HP trend with smoothing
parameter 1600. Standard deviations are relative to output except output.
3.3 Estimation
3.3.1 Parameter estimates
We use Bayesian techniques to estimate the model’s parameters and shock
variances8. The posterior density is evaluated using a random-walk Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm, for which we generate 2 000 000 draws and we target an
acceptance ratio of 0.3. We log-linearize the model around the deterministic
steady state and apply the Kalman filter to evaluate the likelihood function.
We combine the likelihood function with the prior distribution of the model
parameters to obtain the posterior distribution.
We set β to 0.99 and estimate the rest of the parameters. We adopt relatively
8See An & Schorfheide (2007) and Lubik & Schorfheide (2005) for a detailed discussion of
Bayesian estimation of DSGE models.
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loose priors for the model parameters except for the separation rate9 (see Table
5). We assume a beta-distribution for share parameters defined on unit inter-
vals and a gamma-distribution for positive-valued parameters. The mean of
the prior is always set to the value reported in Table 5. The prior means for
the persistence of shocks are set to 0.9. Finally, the priors for the standard de-
viations of shocks follow an inverse-gamma distribution, with a prior mean of
0.01 and an infinite standard deviation. We have two observable variables: the
unemployment rate and the real gross domestic product. We take log and use
an HP-filter with smoothing parameter10 1600.
Variables Symbol
Prior Posterior Confidence
density mean interval
Separation rate s β(0.06, 0.01) 0.056 [0.04, 0.07]
Worker bargaining power ξ β(0.5, 0.1) 0.34 [0.22, 0.45]
Elast. matching w.r.t u γ β(0.5, 0.1) 0.34 [0.22, 0.46]
Utility when unemployed b Γ(0.45, 0.1) 0.44 [0.28, 0.61]
Vacancy posting cost κ Γ(0.66, 0.1) 0.59 [0.45, 0.74]
Matching efficiency χ Γ(0.59, 0.1) 0.48 [0.42, 0.74]
Discount persistence ρβ β(0.90, 0.3) 0.71 [0.71, 0.85]
Discount Std. σβ Γ−1(0.01, ∞) 0.028 [0.0185, 0.0371]
Productivity persistence ρz β(0.90, 0.3) 0.70 [0.73, 0.86]
Productivity Std. σz Γ−1(0.01, ∞) 0.006 [0.0059, 0.0068]
Table 5: ESTIMATION RESULTS
Table 5 reports posterior means of the estimated parameters and the 90%
confidence intervals. Not surprisingly, the standard deviation of the discount
factor shock is larger than that of the productivity shock. The persistence of the
shocks are roughly similar. The Hosios condition is violated. The elasticity of
the matching function with respect to unemployment is too low to ensure effi-
ciency of the labor market (ξ = 1− γ). More important, the value of b remains
low. Estimated parameters are not consistent with the small surplus calibration
based on a very low level of ξ and a high value of b. In other words, the trans-
mission of the discount factor shock is more likely to reproduce the data than
the productivity shock under the small surplus calibration à la Hagedorn &
Manovskii (2008) which is a proxy for rigid wages.
9Due to an identification problem of this parameter we restrict the standard deviation to be
equal to 0.01.
10The results remain the same with a smoothing parameter 105
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3.3.2 Moments
Variables u v θ w y
Standard deviation 9.39 6.33 8.86 1.32 1.51
Autocorrelation 0.92 0.47 0.78 0.78 0.84
Correlation u v θ w y
u 1 -0.66 -0.94 -0.94 -0.77
v 1 0.87 0.87 0.56
θ 1 0.99 0.75
w 1 0.81
y 1
Table 6: LABOR MARKET STATISTICS - MODE OF PARAMETERS ESTIMATE.All
variables are reported in logs as deviations from an HP trend with smoothing param-
eter 1600. Standard deviations are relative to output except output.
We report the moments of the simulated variables using the mode of the pos-
terior distribution as a benchmark for the model’s parameters (see Table 6). It
is shown that the canonical search and matching model generates large fluctu-
ations in the labor market without relying on any form of wage rigidity. The
slope of the Beveridge curve is a little bit lower but still broadly consistent
with the data. Except for vacancies, the model provides enough persistence of
the variables. The volatility of the labor market tightness is not as high as in
the data but still widely acceptable (52%). Furthermore, the presence of two
shocks results in the correlation of unemployment and output to be no longer
equal to -1 as it is the case in a one-shock driven fluctuation setup. The same
result holds for vacancies and the tightness.
3.3.3 Dynamics of unemployment and vacancies
In this section, our objective is to use our structural model to investigate which
shocks are the drivers of unemployment, vacancies and output. To do so, we
analyze the variance decomposition. An inspection of Figures11 3 to 6 makes
it clear that the bulk of variation in unemployment and vacancy is mainly due
to the disturbances pertaining to the discount factor. Only a small fraction of
the fluctuations are generated by the productivity shock. Variations in output
are mainly driven by the productivity shock (70%) and to a lesser extent by the
discount factor shock. However, the discount factor shock has plays a more
11The red shaded area at the beginning of the sample corresponds to the gap between the
initial steady state and the initial value of the data. The trajectory of endogenous variables
is affected by how far from the steady state the system was at first and the shocks arriving
subsequently. So, in the decomposition, we need to keep track of initial conditions so that the
sum of the effects in the graph sums up to the endogenous variable (less its steady state).
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important role for output variations during the recessions: 1953, 1957 and the
Great Recession. Furthermore, while the productivity shock tracks the expan-
sion in 1999, the discount factor shock seems to have a stronger impact on the
subsequent recession (2001) which is broadly consistent with the conventional
view. The productivity shock governs the bulk of variations in output during
the rest of the sample, particularly during the 70’s and 80’s.
1948 Q1 1960 Q2 1972 Q4 1985 Q2 1997 Q4 2010 Q3
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
2007 Q1 2009 Q1 2011 Q1
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Productivity
Great Recession
Discount factor
Cyclical component
Data
Figure 3: Variance decomposition - Unemployment.
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-0.4
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0
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0.2
2007 Q1 2009 Q1 2011 Q1
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Discount factor
Productivity
Great Recession
Cyclical component
(simulated)
Figure 4: Variance decomposition - Vacancies.
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Figure 5: Variance decomposition - Output.
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-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
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-0.02
-0.01
0
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Figure 6: Variance decomposition - Output.
4 Conclusion
Most of the literature on the labor market volatility puzzle has assumed that
changes in productivity are the main, and sometimes only, source of business
cycle fluctuations. The Nash bargaining structure in the search and matching
theory is such that wages reduce the propagation of the productivity shock
which translate little into job creation and unemployment.
In contrast, we argue that the canonical search and matching model is able
to generate enough volatility in unemployment and vacancies if the fluctua-
tions are not solely driven by the standard productivity shock. The discount
factor shock impacts the expected hiring costs in such a way that firms ad-
just vacancies more sharply. An estimation of the model reveals that the dis-
count factor shock is more likely to explain labor market fluctuations than
the productivity associated to the small surplus calibration à la Hagedorn &
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Manovskii (2008). The bulk of variations in unemployment and vacancies is
mainly explained by disturbances pertaining to the discount factor.
Our general conclusion is that the model, even in its standard form, can be
used to investigate labor market dynamic issues without relying on an ad-hoc
wage rigidity or an implausible calibration. The present model is probably too
simple to account for all aspects of the labor market dynamics but alternative
sources of uncertainty like the one coming from the discount factor should be
considered for future research.
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Variables Type Source Code
Output Quantities, s.a, Bureau of Economic Table 1.1.3Index numbers, 2005=100 Analysis (BEA)
Unemployment level, s.a, Bureau of Labor LNS1300000016 years and over Statistics (BLS)
Vacancies
level, s.a, Job openings Bureau of Labor
JTS00000000JOLTotal nonfarm and Help- and Barnichon (2010)
wanted index.
Real wages
Average Hourly Earnings FRED
AHETPI
GDPDEFin $, s.a, Private divided
GDP Deflator, s.a, 2009=100 BEA
Risky rate
Moody’s baa corporate
BAAbonds yield. FRED
Risk free rate FEDFUNDSFederal fund rate FRED
Table 7: Data source and definitions.
Data used to compute the moments cover the periods 1964Q1-2013Q2. We
use the cyclical component of real GDP and unemployment over 1948Q1-2014Q2
for the estimation. All data are taken or built at quarterly frequencies using
average over months if necessary. Vacancies in level are built using the job
opening rate (jot = vt/(vt + nt) and the vacancy index from Barnichon (2010)
which is specified as a base 1998=100. We rescale Barnichon’ series to get a
longer job opening rate series using the first observation of job opening rate
(2001Q1). Then, using employment in level, s.a. we recover vacancies in level
vt = jotnt/(1− jot). The tightness is simply equal to vacancies in level divided
by unemployment in level. The discount factor is calculated in the following
manner:
R =
1 + risky rate
1 + Risk f ree rate
β =
1
R
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